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This article was completed before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Clarett v. National Football
League.1 At the time that this article was completed, the United States Court
of Appeals had not reached a decision regarding the Clarettcase. Accordingly, this article does not comment on any of the court proceedings that
occurred after the initial United States District Court decision in Clarett,or
any possible future decisions regarding this case.2 This article only uses the
framework of the United States District Court decision in Clarett to
comment on what the National Football League should have argued so that
its Special Draft Eligibility Rules could pass antitrust scrutiny.
I. FIRST ROUND-INTRODUCTION
Maurice Clarett was one of the best National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) Division I-A college football players in the country
during the 2002 season. As a true freshman3 at Ohio State University,
Clarett led his team to the 2002 NCAA Division I-A National Football
Championship, and rushed for 1237 yards and sixteen touchdowns during
the regular season.4 In fact, Clarett had better statistics in his freshman year
than former Ohio State and NFL star running backs Archie Griffin, Robert
Smith, and Eddie George." Accordingly, Clarett may be destined for
stardom in the National Football League (NFL), despite not playing college
football during his sophomore year due to NCAA violations.

1

No. 03-CV-7441, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 5,2004), stay denied, 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 1768 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004), application denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231 (Apr. 22, 2004).
2
See id.
Acollege student athlete is a true freshman when he or she plays in varsity level athletic games
during his or her first year at the college. Clarett's performance as a true freshman is significant because
many football players are redshirted their freshman years to allow for further development. Generally,
when a player is redshirted, he or she is allowed to practice with the team, but is not allowed to play in any
games during the season.
3

See

ESPN.com
News Services, Larry Fitzgerald, available at
http://sports.espn.go.comncf/player/profile?playerld= 134936 (last visited Apr. 4,2004). Followingthe
2002 college football season, Clarctt was "named to several 2003 preseason All-America teams, voted the
[number one] running back in college football by the Sporting News, named afirst-team All-Big Ten
pick, and was named Big Ten Freshman of the Year." Complaint at 23, Clarett v. Nat'l Football
League, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (No. 03-CV-7441).
5
See Bruce Feldman, Clarett's Debut One of the Best in Buckeye History (Aug. 24, 2003), available
at http.//espn.go.com/ncf/s/2002/0824/1422378.html.
4
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Although Clarett, weighing 230 pounds and standing six feet tall,6 seems
to be the prototypical player that the NFL desires, 7 this student-athlete will
not have the opportunity to participate in the NFL during the 2004 season
per the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules.8 The Special Draft Eligibility
Rules allow players to enter the draft only after "three full college seasons
have elapsed since their high school graduations." 9 As a result of this rule,
Clarett filed a Complaint against the NFL in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.'0 Among his many claims,
Clarett alleges that the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules violate Section
1 of the Sherman Act" because the Rules constitute an unlawful restraint of
competition.
On February 5, 2004, United States District Court Judge Shira A.
Scheindlin agreed with Clarett that the Special Draft Eligibility Rules violate
"the antitrust laws... [and] cannot preclude Clarett's eligibility for the 2004
NFL draft." 12 In holding that Clarett is now eligible for the draft, Judge
Scheindlin rejected the NFL's four arguments in favor of its Special Draft
Eligibility Rules under the Rule of Reason. 3 This article will not examine

6

Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, stay denied, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1768 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

11, 2004), application denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231 (Apr. 22, 2004).
7
See id. (noting that Clarett "is taller and heavier than some of the NFL's all-time greatest
running backs, includingWalter Payton (5'10", 200), Barry Sanders (5'8", 203) and Emmitt Smith (5'9",
207)").

8
Note that the author refers to the draft rules found in CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE app. 1990-4 (2003) as the Special Draft Eligibility Rules.
9
CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE app. 1990-4 (1) (2003). See also
CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XII, §12.1(A) (2003). The player must
petition the NFL by completing the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility form. This form is not difficult to
complete. In fact, the author completed the form and successfully petitioned the NFL in 2001 to enter
the 2001 draft after his junior season at Cornell University where he was a punter. Furthermore, it
should be noted college players who choose to enter the NFL draft early pursuant to the Special Draft
Eligibility Rules "must include in his application an irrevocable renunciation of any further college
football eligibility." CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE app. 1990-4(3) (2003).
This renouncement of eligibility rule is necessary for the NFL to run efficiently, as it ensures that the Draft
will continue to function. For example, ifa player was allowed to enter the Draft each season and then
return to college if he did not like the club which drafted him, then he would eventually become an
undrafted rookie free agent. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XVI, SS 9, 11 (2002)
(note that this CBA is in effect from 2002-2008). Ifevery player did this process, then the draft would
be obsolete, as most players would desire to be free agents. This would then create a chaotic and
inefficient bidding market for player services.
10
See Complaint, Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396. Although Clarett graduated high school
in December 2001, only two full college seasons have elapsed since he filed this Complaint.
1
15 U.S.C. S 1 (2004). Complaint at
33-34, Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396.
12
Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEUS 1396, at *93.
13
The NFL argued that:
[t]he purposes of the eligibility rule include [1]protecting younger and/or less experienced
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the NFL's losing arguments. Rather, this article will examine the arguments
that the NFL did not formulate in the Clarett lawsuit-arguments that the
author feels would have provided a successful defense from any antitrust
lawsuit regarding the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules under the Rule
of Reason.
After observing the NFL's history and background in Part II and briefly
surveying Section 1 of the Sherman Act and its corresponding legal
doctrine/analysis in Part III, Part IV of this article will examine the best
argument in support of the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules through a
Rule of Reason analysis. Nevertheless, this article will not examine the
Clarettlawsuit specifically. 4 The purpose of this article is to explore the best
possible antitrust arguments in support of the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility
Rules under a Rule ofReason approach-whether the procompetitive effects
of the Special Draft Eligibility Rules outweigh the anticompetitive effectsin regards to possible future litigation on this subject. Itjust so happens that
the NFL did not make the best arguments in the Clarettlawsuit.
II. SECOND RouND - HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE NFL
AND THE NFL DRAFT

A. A BriefOverview of the NFL"5
In 1920, the NFL was formed as an "unincorporated association
comprised of member clubs which own and operate professional football
teams." 6 Compared to otherAmerican professional sports, like baseball, the

players-that is,players who are less mature physically and psychologically-from heightened
risks of injury in NFL games; [2] protecting the NFL's entertainment product from the
adverse consequences associated with such injuries; [31 protecting the NFL clubs from the
costs and potential liability entailed by such injuries; and [4] protecting from injury and selfabuse other adolescents who would over-train-and use steroids-in the misguided hope of
developing prematurely the strength and speed required to play in the NFL.
Claret, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *85.
14
See Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396; see also A. Randall Farnsworth, Herschel Walker v.
NationalFootballLeague:A HypotheticalLawsuit Challengingthe Proprietyofthe NationalFootballLeague'sFouror-Five Year Rule Under the Shennan Act, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 603 (1982) (analyzing a hypothetical antitrust
lawsuit between Herschel Walker and the NFL in regard to the NFL's draft eligibility rules prior to the
enactment of the Special Draft Eligibility Rules in 1990).
is
See also American Football History, available at httpV/wiwi.essortment.com/americanfootbal_
rwff.htm (last visited Apr. 4,2004) (providing an overview of the history of professional football in the
United States and NFL).
16
Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
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NFLwas not taken seriously17 until the NFL hired Pete Rozelle as Commissioner in 1960.18 The year prior to Rozelle's hiring, the NFL had seventytwo games a year that were watched by approximately 3,140,000 paid spectators.' 9 In 1973, thirteen years after Rozelle took over as Commissioner, the
NFL had 182 games a year attended by approximately 10,731,000 paid
spectators. 0 Furthermore, in 1962, Rozelle negotiated the NFL's first
league-wide television contract, which paid an estimated $326,000 per year
to each member club. 2' There is no doubt that the NFL transformed under
Rozelle from a mediocre professional sports league with modest support to
a dominant professional sports league. The NFL transformed itself into a
marketing machine with a business mastermind at its helm.22
In 1968, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recognized the
National Football League Players' Association (NFLPA) as a labor organization, further cementing the NFL as a true business organization.23 For the
first time in NFL history, players gained a substantial voice in the operation
of the NFL and in the terms of their employment. Accordingly, in the years
following the NFLPA's inception, the NFL players and the NFL clubs have
collectively bargained over a myriad of terms and conditions on player
employment, including the NFL draft and NFL operations, in its Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Today, the NFL, both as a source of entertainment and as a business
entity, is flourishing even more than it did during the Rozelle years (1960s
and 1970s).4 The NFL is first and foremost a business, and this plays an

17
In a 1961 Gallup Pole, 34 percent ofthe country reported that baseball was their favorite sport,
whereas only 21 percent felt that football was their favorite sport. See DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE 5
(Bantam Books 1986).
18
By 1972, 36 percent of the country reported football to be their favorite sport, whereas only
21 percent reported baseball to be their favorite sport. See id.
19

See id.

10

See id.

21

See id.

22

According to the NFL Constitution and By-laws:
[T]he purpose and objects for which the [NFL] is organized are: (A) To promote and foster
the primary business ofthe [NFL] members, each member being an owner of a professional
football club ... (B) To do and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out
the purpose and objects of the [NFL].
CONST. AND BYLAWS FORTHE NAT'L FOOTBALLLEAGUE art. II, §§ 2.1(A), (B) (2003).
2
See Mackey, 543 F.2d 610.
24
The NFL is a multi-billion dollar business today. See American Football History, available at
http://wiwi.essortment.com/americanfootbal_rwff.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
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important role when analyzing the NFL through an antitrust lens. " The
NFL's rules and regulations, either as created by the NFL clubs, the
Commissioner, or collectively bargained with the NFLPA in the CBA, are
geared towards maximizing the NFL's profits, which correlate to maximization of each member club's profits.
The NFL is not the typical business enterprise.2 6 Although each
member club is owned and operated independently, per the NFL's
Constitution and Bylaws, each member club shares its revenues from
television contracts and a large portion of its revenues from ticket sales. 7
Therefore, although each club is competing with one another on the playing
field for the best record and off the playing field for the best players,
member clubs are not necessarily competing against one another for
revenues.2 -8 Under the NFL's revenue sharing model, the only way to
maximize profit is for each game to be as competitive as possible. 29 More
exciting football games result in more fan support; more fan support results
in more ticket sales and larger television contracts, 30 as well as other sources
of revenue that are not shared among NFL clubs. 3' Accordingly, rules like

25

"In the 1990s [the NFL] is a business and a science that is played incidentally as a game."

RICHARDWHITTINGHAM,THEMEATMARKET 79 (Macmillan PublishingCompany 1992) [hereinafter
WHITTINGHAM].

26

See David G. Kabbes, Note: Professional Sports' Eligibility Rules: Too Many Players on the Field,

1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1247 (1986) (explaining that the NFL is a "unique business").
7
See CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. X, . 10.3; art. XIX, .
19. 1(A); 1999 Res. G-3, 2001 Res. G-1 (2003). These two sources provide a great source of revenue for
NFL Clubs.
Is
As a member of the NFL, each NFL club competes against other clubs of other professional

sports leagues-the National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, the National Hockey
League -for revenues and market share. Because the majority of NFL clubs are located in different
metropolitan areas, they do not compete against one another for market share. However, there are two
metropolitan areas which are home to more than one club-NewYork Giants/NewYorkJets, Oakland
Raiders/San Francisco 49ers. Nevertheless, both the Giants/Jets and the Raiders/49ers never played a
home game on the same day during the 2003-04 season. NFL Team-By-Team Schedules, Chicago SunTimes, Sept. 4, 2003, at 20. This scheduling technique reduces the competition between each team in
the same market.
9
NFL clubs are able to generate revenue which is not shared among each NFL club, NFL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXIV, § 1(a) (2002) (noting that teams do not share certain
revenue such as "revenue derived from concessions, parking, local advertising... [ and certain] luxury
box income."). Nevertheless, the only way for each club to maximize total revenue is for the NFL, as
a whole, to maximize revenue-the whole equals the sum of its parts. See interview with an NFL club
executive and an NFL club attorney who both requested to remain anonymous (Nov. 5, 2003)
(reinforcing this theory).
M)
E.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
31
See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXIV, S 1(a) (2002).
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the salary cap, 32 draft,33 and draft eligibility rules' even out the talent 5
between clubs. These rules also ensure that every player maintains a
threshold skill level throughout his career since no spectator wants to watch
football games played by inept football players.
When analyzing the NFL through an antitrust paradigm, it is imperative
that a court examines the NFL through a special lens.36 A court must
consider the NFL's unusual revenue sharing model, its unusual infrastructure, and its underlying business motives. The NFL competes against other
professional sports leagues and other entertainment mediums for revenue
more than NFL clubs compete against each other for revenues.37 In
recognition of these unique attributes, a court cannot analyze the NFL
under a conventional business framework.
B. A Brief Overview of the NFL Draft
Most professional sports leagues have a draft,38 which is designed to
create an efficient and cost-effective way of bringing new players into the
league. The draft also serves the purpose of distributing talent equally
between clubs. 39 In other words, the worst team from the previous season
will have the first choice in a round (it will select the best player for its
team), and the best team from the previous season will have the final choice
in a round (it will select the best player available from the remaining draft
pool). 4 Thus, the worst teams have the best chance at gaining an impact
player who will help the entire team improve in the upcoming season.
The NFL's first draft occurred in 1935, and continues to be the most
important and efficient way for new talent to enter the NFL.4' The court in
See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXIV& XXV.
See NFL COLLECTIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XVI. CONST. AND BYLAWS FORTHE
NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XII (2003).
32

33
34

See NFLCOLLECTIvE BARGAININGAGREEMENT art. XVI (2002). CONST.AND BYLAWS FOR

THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XI; 1990 Res. 4(1) (2003).

The talent being both veteran players, and future players who will be acquired through the
NFL draft and through waivers.
36
See infra Part III.
37
See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
38
All of the major professional sports leagues in the United States have a draft. This includes
the NFL, the National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball.
However, each league has different draft rules and draft eligibility requirements.
39
See WHITTINGHAM, supra note 25 at 73 (quoting Jim Finks, president of the New Orleans
Saints, and Chairman of the NFL's Competition Committee in 1991).
40
See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175. Note an NFL club may pass on the best overall player in the draft
for the best player for its club's style of play at a specific position.
41
See, e.g., WHITTINGHAM, supra note 25 (describing the NFL draft using the 1991 draft as an
35
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Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 42 described the draft as a "procedure under which
negotiating rights to graduating college football players are allocated each
year among the NFL clubs in inverse order of the clubs' standing." 43 The
Smith court commented that the "NFL draft... is designed to promote
'competitive balance' [within the NFL]."44 However, the Smith court held
that the draft, as it existed in 1968, was in violation of antitrust laws.4 5
Nevertheless, the court in Powell v. National Football League,4 6 held that the
NFL draft was not in violation of antitrust laws because the "College Player
Draft was a subject of mandatory bargaining"47 between the NFL and the
NFLPA in the CBA.4 ' Because the NFL draft was the result of a good faith
arms-length agreement, the NFL received a labor exemption from antitrust
laws49 in regards to the draft during the years in which that particular CBA
was valid.50 Both current and future players are bound to the terms of the
draft as outlined in the requisite CBA. 5'
Although the CBA acknowledges the draft process, there is no language
in the current CBA (2002-08) describing the Special Draft Eligibility Rules

example). However, a player, who is not drafted or who chooses not to sign with the team that drafted
him, becomes an undrafted free agent. An undrafted free agent, unlike a drafted player, can bargain with
every NFL club. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XVI, SS 4-9, 11 (2002).
42
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
43
Id. at 1175.
44

45
46
47

Id.

See id. at 1186-88.
711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. 1989).
Id. at 962. The analysis used in Powell is known as the Mackey Test, which was derived in
Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that "the agreements
between the clubs and the players embodying the Rozelle Rule do not qualify for the labor exemption").
48
See Powell, 711 F. Supp. at 964. See also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)
(holdingthat the non-statutory labor exemption applies to aunilateral change to player contracts-when
negotiations reached an impasse-because the provision was within the scope of the NFL's CBA);
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, No. 03-CV-7441,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at*38-47 (S.D.N.YFeb.
5, 2004) (alluding to the fact that the draft process in general receives the non-statutory labor exemption
from antitrust scrutiny).
49
See, e.g., Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
Inc., 381 U.S. 676,710 (1965) (holdingthat collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects
of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust laws); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 US 657, 667 (1965).
50
See Powell, 711 F. Supp. at 964. Nevertheless, courts do recognize that the NFL draft does
place restrictions on players in that a drafted rookie player who "does not wish to sign a contract with or
play for the NFL club which 'owns' the rights to him, ... [cannot] negotiate with or play for any other
NFL club" during that season. Id. at 962.
51
See id. at 963. Accord Zimmerman v. Nat'l Football League, 632 F. Supp 398, 405 (D.D.C.
1986) (stating "not only present but potential future players for a professional sports league are parties
to the bargaining agreement").
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adopted by the NFL in 1990.52 Therefore, the labor exemption may not be
a viable defense for the NFL because the Special Draft Eligibility Rules are
only contained in the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws;"3 technically, the
Special Draft Eligibility Rules are not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 4
Accordingly, an inquiry into Section 1 of the Sherman Act is necessary in
order to determine whether the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules satisfy
the law.
III. THIRD ROUND-BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1 OF
THE SHERMAN ACT"

The ShermanAct was enacted in 1890 and designed as a "comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. ",56 Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
is... illegal."57 This legislatrade or commerce among the several States ...
tion was left open-ended, as Senator Sherman, sponsor of the Act, realized
that the large number of business organizations made a rigid legislative
framework impractical.*" Accordingly, courts developed different rationales
for analyzing antitrust suits based on the different business and trade
practices, and filled in these large interpretive gaps missing in Section 1 of
the Sherman Act."9
.2
53

See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (2002).
See CONST. AND BYLAWS FORTHE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XII,§ 12.1(A), app. 1990-

4(1) (2003).
5A
In fact, the court in Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, No. 03-CV-7441, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEIS
1396, at *30-50 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 5, 2004) held that the non-statutory labor exemption does not apply to
the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules. Nevertheless, it seems that the NFL could challenge this
ruling in a future lawsuit.
ss
Note that the purpose of this article is not to give the general history of Antitrust law or the
Sherman Act. However, the purpose of this section is to explore briefly thejudiciary's framework for
analysis in order to examine further the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules under an Antitrust lens.
56
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
57
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
58
Senator Sherman stated that:
...it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful
combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case. All that
we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the
courts will apply them as to carry out the meaning of the law, as the courts of England and
the United States have done for centuries. This bill is only an honest effort to declare a rule
of action.
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional andAntitrustAnalysis,
James May, Antitrust in the
9
1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 300 n.35 (1989) (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890)).
59
See id. The Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States found that because:
the contracts or acts embraced in [Section 1of the Sherman Act] were not expressly defined
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Generally, courts employ two frameworks-Per Se and the Rule of
Reason-for analyzing claims in violation of the Sherman Act.60 As a result,
courts generally hold that certain trade practices such as price fixing,6'
division of markets,'a group boycotts," and tying arrangements 64 constitute
a Per Se violation of the Sherman Act. The Court in Northern Pacfic
Railvay Co. v. United States65 best explained the rationale for a Per Se
violation by stating, "there are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." 66
On the other hand, where the trade practice does not have such a
pernicious effect on competition and has some redeeming virtue, the courts
will employ the Rule of Reason.67 The Rule of Reason approach requires a
detailed factual inquiry in order for a court to determine whether a particular
practice is procompetitive or anticompetitive, and whether the particular
restraint on trade was unreasonable. The Court in Chicago Boardof Trade v.
United States68 stated:

*

. it inevitably follows that . . . the standard of reason which had been applied at the

common law and in this country... was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong
against which the statute provided.
221 U.S. 1,60(1911).
60
The Court in Nat'l Society of Profl Eng'rs v. United States explains:
[t]here are ... two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are
-agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are "illegal per se." In the
second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reason why it was
imposed.
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
61
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940).
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
62
63
See Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207,212 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941).
64
See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
65

66

356 U.S. 1 (1958).

Id.at5.
The Court in Standard Oil Co.v.United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911) was the first to advance
heavily the Rule of Reason standard; this decision gave courts much discretion in Sherman Act lawsuits.
68
246 U.S. 231 (1911). See also
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 228 US 344 (1933).
Note that Court in Chicago Bd. of Trade never used the phrase Rule of Reason. Nevertheless, legal
scholars frequently cite this decision as a classic case which employed the Rule of Reason. E.g., E.
THOMAS SULLIVAN &JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS S 4.05, at 127-29 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter SULLIVAN & HARRISON].
67
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[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarilyconsider thefacts peculiar to
the business . . . ; its conditions before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained are all relevant facts.69
Furthermore, the Court in Mackey v. NationalFootballLeague7" noted that the
"focus of an inquiry under the Rule of Reason is whether the restraint
imposed isjustified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more restrictive than necessary."7'
The first issue in a Sherman Act lawsuit is whether the Rule of Reason
or the Per Se test should apply.72 If a court declares that the alleged business
practice is without redeeming competitive effects, then the factual inquiry
ends, as the practice is Per Se illegal. However, if a court finds that the
business is of apeculiar nature, and that the business aspect at issue has possible procompetitive effects, then a court must utilize the Rule of Reason
approach. Accordingly, a court should analyze the NFL's Special Draft
Eligibility Rules under a Rule of Reason approach 73 because the NFL, like
other sports leagues, has an abnormal business structure and can sufficiently
allege to a court that its Special Draft Eligibility Rules have procompetitive
effects.74

Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
543 F. 2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
71
Id. at 620 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231 (1911); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v.
Nat'l BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974)).
72
Courts have not developed a rigid test to determine whether the Per Se rule or the Rule of
should
be used because "[nlot all restrictive conduct is inherently anticompetitive." SULLIVAN
Reason
& HARRISON, supra note 68, § 4.05, at 127. This is mainly a result of the fact that "antitrust laws are
largely judge made, derived from statutory interpretation." Id. Accordingly, determinations are made
on a case-by-case basis on "fine line distinctions." Id. As a result, this area of the law is inconsistent. Id.
However, some courts have created standards to aid themselves in determining which test should be
used, beyond if the business practice fits into one of the Per Se categories. See, e.g., Levine v. Cent.
Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. 72 F.3d 1538, 1549 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying the Per Se rule "onlywhen
history and analysis have shown that in sufficient similar circumstances the rule of reason unequivocally
results in a finding of liability") (quoting Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553
(11th Cir. 1983)).
73
See infra Part W.A.
74
See infra Part IV.B.
69

70
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IV. FOURTH ROUND-SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE
NFL's SPECIAL DRAFT ELIGIBILITY RULES

A. PriorApplication of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule in Sports
Leagues' Antitrust Lawsuits
When dealing with antitrust disputes regarding sports leagues such as
professional football,75 professional basketball,76 and professional golf,7
courts often apply a Rule of Reason approach due to the peculiar business
78
nature of sports leagues. In fact, in Clarett v. National Football League,
75
See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (employing a Rule of Reason
analysis in regards to an antitrust challenge to the NFL draft); Mackeyv. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d
606 (8th Cir. 1976) (employing a Rule of Reason analysis in regards to an antitrust challenge to the
Rozelle Rule); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984) (employing a Rule of Reason analysis in regards to an antitrust challenge of an NFL club's relocation to another city); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (employing a Rule of Reason analysis in regards to an antitrust challenge
of the NFL's cross ownership ban); butsee Bowman v. Nat'l Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn.
1975) (employing an analysis similar to the Per Se analysis in regards to an antitrust challenge of the
NFL's refusal to contract during the season with former World Football League players, whose league
folded in the middle of the season).
76
See Molinas v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n., 190 F. Supp 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (employing a Rule
of Reason approach in regards to a rule which prohibited a player who gambled from playing in the
National Basketball Association); cf. Denver Rockets v. Haywood, 325 F. Supp 1049 (D. Cal. 1971)
(employing a Per Se approach in an antitrust challenge where a professional basketball player, Haywood,
in a rival professional basketball league was not allowed to play in the National Basketball Association,
pursuant to the league's eligibility rules, after he had already contracted to play with a National Basketball
Association club). In a similar case to Denver Rockets, Linseman, a professional hockey player challenged
the draft rules of the World HockeyAssociation-similar to the National Hockey League-in an antitrust
action. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). Here, the court
employed a Per Se approach like the court in Denver Rockets because Linseman, like Haywood, was
already a professional player. See id. The Denver Rockets and Linseman courts used the Per Se rule because
the courts are analyzing the eligibility rules in regard to those players who have played professionally in
the same sport before but never in that particular sports league. This is a different scenario from the
investigation posed in this article, as it analyzes an antitrust challenge from those who have never played
professionally before (amateurs) in the sport in which they are trying to gain eligibility. This article does
not attempt to explore an antitrust lawsuit in regards to whether a professional football player in another
professional football league could enter the NFL, even if that player did not satisfy the requirements of
the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules.
7n
See Deesen v. Prof I Golfer's Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (using a Rule of
Reason approach where a golfer challenged the PGA's tournament eligibility rules). Although the
Professional Golfer's Association is not technically a league, it is a professional golfing organization with
blanket rules and regulations.
78
No. 03-CV-7441, 2004 U.S. Dist. LE)IS 1396 (S.D.N.YFeb. 5,2004), stay denied, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1798 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004), application denied, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3231 (Apr. 22,
2004).
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United States District CourtJudge Scheindlin decided that the "validity of
the [NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules] must be analyzed under the Rule
of Reason."7 9 On the other hand, professional baseball is exempt from antitrust law.80 However, the Court in Flood v. Kuhn8 acknowledged that the
only reason baseball receives an exemption is because "[it is an aberration
that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's
expanding concept of interstate commerce."82 Subsequently, the Court
stated that the only way to change this anomaly is through congressional
legislation.'
B. Rule ofReason Analysis of the NFL's Best Arguments for Upholding Its
Special Draft EligibilityRules84
In order for the NFL to successfully defend itself against an antitrust
challenge to its Special Draft Eligibility Rules, the NFL must argue that its
79
Id. at *75-76. See also Spencer R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the
Legality of Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen From EnteringProfessional Sports Drafts,
8 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS L. 539, 556 (1998) [hereinafter Rosner] (commenting that it is "now clear that
a Rule of Reason analysis should be performed in any future challenges to the draft eligibility rules of
the professional sports leagues, includingone which limits the ability of athletes to enter the draft directly
out of high school").
80
See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof lBaseball, 259 U.S. 200
(1922) (exempting professional baseball from antitrust laws).
81
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
81
Id. at 282 (furthering the exemption of professional baseball from antitrust laws); see also
Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445,451 (1957) (limitingthe holdingofFederal BaseballClub
of Baltimore to only professional baseball).
83
Flood, 407 U.S. at 279 (quoting Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450-52).
84
Note that the NFL could make other arguments in defense of its Special Draft Eligibility
Rules prior to a court analyzing this alleged antitrust violation under the Rule of Reason analysis. The
NFLcould argue that it is ajoint Venture/Single Entity, thus precluding an antitrust inquiry. See Robert
C. Heintel, The Needfor an Ahenative Regulation of the NationalFootball League, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1033, 1042-45 (1996) [hereinafter Heintel]; but see Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984). Or it may claim that it is a Natural Monopoly,
thus limiting antitrust attacks. See Heintel at 1052-56. Moreover, the NFL could argue the Ancillary
Restraint Doctrine, see Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1102 (1st Cir. 1994), or the Labor
Exemption, see Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 711 F. Supp. 959, at 964; but see Clarett v. Nat'l Football
League, No. 03-CV-7441, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *30-50 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 5, 2004) (stating that
the nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply to the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules); Robert
A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, ProfessionalFootball'sDraft EligibilityRule: The LaborExemption
and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L. J. 375, 381-417 (1984); Finally, the NFL may be able to avoid
judicial scrutiny altogether by arguing that this type of restraint is a matter that should be left to the
legislature, as Congress has granted sports leagues exceptions to antitrust law in certain instances. See
15 U.S.C § 1291 (2003) (exempting "agreements covering the telecast of sports contests and the
combining of professional football leagues" from antitrust laws).
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Special Draft Eligibility Rules promote competition among its member clubs
for the services of future players. However, at first glance, it appears that the
NFL does not have any strong arguments that show that its Special Draft
Eligibility Rules promote competition.8 5 The NFL cannot deny that its
Rules are anticompetitive in nature. The Special Draft Eligibility Rules do
exclude certain younger players, who may be capable of performing at the
NFL level successfully, from marketing their services to each NFL club
through the draft process. These Rules completely eliminate competition
between clubs for the services of these younger players who are not yet
eligible, and restrict the freedom of these younger players to offer their
services to interested clubs. Nevertheless, when analyzing the NFL's Special
Draft Eligibility Rules under the proper framework, a court should find that
these Rules are more procompetitive than anticompetitive.86
1. PRIOR DRAFT ANALYSIS - SMITH V. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,87 Washington Redskins wide receiverJames
McCoy (Yazoo) Smith challenged the NFL Draft as it existed in 1968,
alleging that it was "an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
[Section 1 of the Sherman Act], and that, but for the draft, he would have
negotiated a far more lucrative contract when he signed as a player in [ 1968
draft]."88 Although the draft may resemble a group boycott, the Smith court
found that the NFL's unique structure requires a Rule of Reason analysis,
precluding a classic group boycott (Per Se) analysis. 9 Nevertheless, the
Smith court held that the NFL draft was "an unreasonable restraint of trade
...[and] ...was concededly anticompetitive in purpose. "90 The Smith
court explained:
The justification asserted for the draft is that it has the legitimate
business purpose of promoting "competitive balance" and playingfield equality among the teams, producing better entertainment for
the public, higher salaries for the players, and increased financial
security for the clubs. The NFL has endeavored to summarize this
justification by saying that the draft ultimately has a "procompetitive" effect, yet this shorthand entails no small risk of confusion.

85

86

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See iltfia Parts IV.B. 1-5.

593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1174-75. Note that the Smith Court did not specifically analyze the draft eligibility
requirements. Rather, it analyzed the draft process as awhole.
89
See id. at 1179.
97

88

90

Id. at 1187.
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The draft is "procompetitive," if at all, in a very different sense from
that in which it is anticompetitive. The draft is anticompetitive in
its effect on the market for players' services, because it virtually
eliminates economic competition among buyers for the services of
sellers. The draft is allegedly "procompetitive" in its effect on the
playing field; but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on
the playing field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic
competition and thus improve the entertainment product offered to
the public, does not increase competition in the economic sense of
encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at
lower cost. Because the draft's "anticompetitive" and "procompetitive" effects are not comparable, it is impossible to "net them out"
in the usual rule-of-reason balancing. The draft's "anticompetitive
evils," in other words, cannot be balanced against its "procompetitive virtues," and the draft be upheld if the latter outweigh the
former. In strict economic terms, the draft's demonstrated
procompetitive effects are nil.9
The Smith court held that the NFL draft, as it existed in 1968, was illegal
under the Rule of Reason. Accordingly, the Smith court's holding seems to
present prima facie evidence that any future draft or further draft restriction
would be illegal. Even though the Powell court sidestepped the Smith
court's holding through the labor exemption, legalizing the NFL draft
process described in the CBA,93 the NFL still must overcome this harsh
analysis in order to prevail in a Section 1 lawsuit with regard to its Special
Draft Eligibility Rules. A player challenging these Special Draft Eligibility
Rules would rely on the Smith court's analysis and analogize the
anticompetitive effects of the NFL draft to the anticompetitive effects of
Special Draft Eligibility Rules-both of which "eliminate economic
competition among buyers for the services of sellers,

. .

. [and do not

encourage] ... others to enter the market and to offer the product at lower
cost.,

94

Furthermore, this player would also rely on National Society of

Professional Engineers v. United States95 for the proposition that a court's
analysis of the Special Draft Eligibility Rules should focus on the
"competitive significance of the restraint... [and not] ... whether a policy

91
92

Id. at 1186.
Accord Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, No. 03-CV-7441,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *78-

84 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 5, 2004) (describing Clarett's prima facie antitrust claim under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
93
See Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 711 F. Supp. 959, 964 (D. Minn. 1989).
94
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
95
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry."' In other words, a rule that simply makes football
games more exciting is not an adequate reason for a court to uphold the rule
under antitrust scrutiny.
2. CURTAILING ANALOGIES TO SMITH V. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.
When formulating its arguments for its Special Draft Eligibility Rules,
the NFL cannot rely solely on an argument that the Special Draft Eligibility
Rules are necessary for the economic survival of the league, or on the
reasoning the NFL used in Smith, because a court would reject both.
Rather, the NFL must show that the procompetitive effects of the Special
Draft Eligibility Rules outweigh their anticompetitive effects, or at least, the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects net out. 97 The NFL would
distinguish the antitrust NFL draft analysis in Smith because the current
NFL draft has changed since 1968. Furthermore, the Powell court held that
the draft process in general is legal under the non-statutory labor exemption.
Even though the Special Draft Eligibility Rules are not found in the CBA,
these Special Draft Eligibility Rules evolved partly from the fact that the
draft process is a legal and accepted business practice in the NFL market for
new player services. In fact, the Special Draft Eligibility Rules are actually
less restrictive than the eligibility requirements imposed prior to 1990.98
The NFL can circumvent a challenger's argument that the Smith court's
holding should apply to the Special Draft Eligibility Rules by analogy.
Although the Smith court is correct in observing that players cannot offer
their services at a lower cost,' this aspect of the draft process is presently
legal under the non-statutory labor exemption. This particular anticompetitive aspect of the draft is not currently challengeable under antitrust laws."°
%

Id. at 692. Accord Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (applying this analysis to the NFL draft).
See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188-89.
The NFL's General Rules of Eligibility state:
[n]o person shall be eligible to play or be selected as a player unless (1)all college football
eligibility of such player has expired; or (2)at least five (5)years shall have elapsed since the
player first entered or attended arecognizedjunior college, college, or university; or (3)such
player receives adiploma from a recognized college or university prior to September 1st of
the next football season of the League.
CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XI, S 12.1 (A) (2003).
9
The Smith court found that the NFL draft process does "not increase competition in the
economic sense ofencouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at lower cost." Smith,
593 F.2d at 1186.
100 Furthermore, the minimum rookie salary scale, also legal per the CBA, eliminates potential
players from offering their services below a certain minimum. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT art. XXXVIIH, §6 (2002). This also precludes the effect of a decrease in players' salary if
97
98
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The Special Draft Eligibility Rules only effect the eligibilityrequirementsfor the
draft, as the legalized draft process is responsible for disallowing players to
create a more competitive market by offering their services at a lower cost
to each club.'0 ' Therefore, an analysis proceeds on the assumption that a
potential draftee challenging the Special Draft Eligibility Rules can only
argue that these particular eligibility requirements spurn anticompetitive
effects. This lower cost argument is only attributable to the draft process, not
to the draft's eligibility requirements. A court must examine the Special
Draft Eligibility Rules through a lens, which accepts the draft process as a
baseline that is currently unchallengeable.
Nevertheless, an ineligible player would still argue that the NFL must
overcome the Smith court's analysis. The Smith court states the NFL cannot
offset the economic anticompetitive effects of its draft (and the Special Draft
Eligibility Rules by analogy) by creating competition for players' services on
the field "[b]ecause the draft's 'anticompetitive' and 'procompetitive' effects
are not comparable." °2 However, the Smith court is missing a vital step in
its analysis-the court does not understand the NFL as a business. If NFL
clubs are able to assess fully potential draftees and ensure that each potential
draftee has a requisite level of talent, then clubs are more likely to draft the
highest percentage of the best and most mature players each year from the
general draft pool. Ifclubs are consistently able to draft the best players each
year, then each club will compete against one another on the playing field
with the best players. Better players on the field will result in a better
entertainment product, which will result in more shared and non-shared
revenues for each NFL club.'13 If drafting better players helps to increase
each club's total revenues, economic competition is created among clubs to
draft better players; each club desires to maximize shared and non-shared
revenues. Therefore, a court could adequately compare the Special Draft
Eligibility Rules' procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, since they both
have economic foundations. Even though the Special Draft Eligibility Rules
restrict certain players from entering the draft market (an economic
anticompetitive effect), they also help create an efficient draft market. This

more players are allowed to enter the market. Although this may seem anticompetitive because this
provision is in the CBA, it receives the nonstatutory labor exemption.
101 Each player is only allowed to offer his services at a lower cost after he is drafted. This
negotiation is post-draft and has little effect on which player a club drafts. However, it may affect which
players are signed to a professional contract. Furthermore, after the draft concludes, those players not
drafted become undrafted free agents and may offer their services to clubs at a lower cost, but not lower
than the minimum salary scale. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XVI, SS 9, 11 & art.
XXXVIII, §6 (2002).
10C2 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
103
See supra Part ILA.
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efficient market allows each club to reduce its draft risk"° and compete more
with one another to draft the best players-better players equaling more
revenue (an economic procompetitive effect).
3. THE EFFICIENCY REVIEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE RULE OF REASON
The NFL's best arguments center on the fact that its Special Draft
Eligibility Rules are the most efficient way for NFL member clubs to acquire
rights to future players in the draft framework.'0 An efficient NFL draft
market for player services creates more procompetitive effects than a draft6
without the Special Draft Eligibility Rules. In NCAA v. Board of Regents,'0
the Court dealt with the NCAA's television plan to increase total profits by
limiting the number of college athletic team sports games each college could
televise in order to increase total profits. The NCAA Court reasoned that
this was a horizontal restraint on "NCAA member institutions to compete
in terms of price and output." 0 7 The Court acknowledged "that this case
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all"'08 (restraints based upon
efficiency), and that "a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires
consideration ofthe NCAA'sjustifications for the restraint" 1 9 (justifications
for its restraints based upon efficiency). In employing this efficiencv-based
framework for a snorts-related case, the NCAA court cited BroadcastMusic,
Inc. v. ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem" 0 for the proposition that "ajoint selling
arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output
and thus be procompetitive."1" In other words, if the restraint is necessary
for the business to run in an efficient manner, and is more procompetitive
than not, then the trade practice may pass antitrust scrutiny.' Although the
NCAA Court held that that the "NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced
the place of intercollegiate athletics ... by curtailing output and blunting the
104

See ifra Part IV.B.3.

10s

The Smith court admits "some form of player selections system may serve to regulate and

thereby promote competition in what would otherwise be a chaotic bidding market for the services of
college players." Smith, 593 F.2d at 1181.
1P

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 102.

108

Id. at 101.

109

Id. at 103.

110

441 U.S. 1 (1979).

ill

NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (citing BMI, 441 U.S. at 18-23).
The BMI Court stated that one review standard for the Rule of Reason analysis is whether

106

11-

the business practice is "designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive.'" BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
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ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference,"" 3 the
NCAA Court's efficiency framework is appropriate for analyzing a
controversy involving the NFL and its Special Draft Eligibility Rules.
Through its Special Draft Eligibility Rules, the NFL makes its legalized draft
for player services more efficient,
which results in more competition between
4
clubs for player services."
4. THE EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS FOR THE NFL'S SPECIAL DRAFT
ELIGIBILITY RULES

The NFL should argue that the Special Draft Eligibility Rules create an
efficient means for obtaining players' rights and services in the draft market.
Although the Special Draft Eligibility Rules create a smaller draft market as
compared to a market in which all potential draftees could enter within the
basic draft system, this smaller market fosters more competition between
member clubs for player services because it allows each member club to
fairly assess which players to draft. Currently, NFL clubs have a difficult
time assessing a potential draftee's talent, which results in a draft risk. This
process is not only a risk,"5 but it is very costly and time consuming as
well." 6 For example, in his experience as an NFL coach, Bill Arnsparger
explains, "generally half of those drafted would be released by the start of the
regular season [because they are not ready or able to play at the NFL
level].""' A fifty percent success rate in drafting players seems to be quite
a risk, as this is a high turnover draft rate. Furthermore, both Bill
Arnsparger and Rich Mercier,"' former offensive lineman for the Baltimore

114

NCAA, 468 U.S. at 120.
See itfra Part IV.B.4.

1s

In other words when aclub drafts a player, there isa high risk that the player will not perform

113

well at the professional level.
116
Scouts and coaches spend countless hours going through film of each individual player, and
observing players at games, practices, and workouts.
117
E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach (Nov. 27, 2003), whose
experience includes not only NFL coaching (he was Head Coach of the New York Giants, Defensive
Coordinator ofthe Miami Dolphins, and Assistant Coach ofthe Baltimore Colts) but NCAA experience
(he was Head Coach at Louisiana State University, Special Teams Coach at Cornell University) as well.
One NFL club commented that it is "very hard to project how a player at college will perform at the
[professional level]." Interview with an NFL club executive and an NFL club attorney who both
requested to remain anonymous (Nov. 5, 2003). Furthermore, this risk is exemplified by the fact that
'more than 360 non-senior players entered the draft between 1990 and 2000. Ofthat group, almost one
out ofevery four was never offered an NFL contract," and this number does not even include those who
received a contract, but had short/unsuccessful professional careers. See Liz Clarke, Boys to Men: NFL
Continues to Block Young Ones, The Washington Post, Nov. 8, 2002, at D01 [hereinafter Clarke].
118 Mercier was an All American Offensive Lineman for the University of Miami (Fla.) (UM),
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Ravens, estimate that it costs the NFL a large sum of money to invite each
potential player to the NFL scouting combines," ' as well as unspecified, but
great scouting costs, which Richard Whittingham reports to be over $1
million per team. 120 If more players are allowed to enter the draft, then
presumably the NFL would incur more costs in scouting these players, and
the scouting reports would be less thorough due to the influx of players
enteringthe draft and the rigid time constraints. As a result, the draft market
would be less efficient, making it more difficult for clubs to assess the talent
of potential draftees in an accurate manner. Therefore, NFL clubs are less
likely to compete for players' draft rights if they cannot assess players in an
accurate manner.
The Special Draft Eligibility Rules reduce the draft risk that each club
incurs when drafting a college player. By increasing the reliability of
information obtained from scouting players and reducing costs, member
clubs form stronger opinions about whom they desire to draft. As a result,
this draft risk factor will be reduced, and NFL clubs will compete more with
one another during the draft because clubs are more likely to compete for
a player's draft rights if they are better able to assess talent. Furthermore,
with a smaller draft pool, players will now have more competition between
one another as they compete for draft status-the more talented players
having a higher draft status. This causes players to train harder for draft
status, and allows clubs to better assess their talents. If NFL clubs are not
able to distinguish players from one another, and in turn, players are not able
to adequately distinguish themselves from one another, then competition
between each club for these players in the draft pool will decrease because
each draftee will appear equal.t2 If a club can easily substitute one player for

and was drafted by the Baltimore Ravens, in 2000 where he played for three seasons. See Interview with
Rich Mercier, Former Offensive Lineman for the Baltimore Ravens in Miami, Fla. (Nov. 17, 2003).
119
See Interview with Rich Mercier, Former Offensive Lineman for the Baltimore Ravens, in
Miami, Fla. (Nov. 17, 2003); E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach, (Jan.
28,2004). NFL combines are sanctioned workouts where potential draftees work out for NFL clubs,
so that clubs are better able to evaluate their abilities. Some combines are invitation only, whereas others
are open to any player who is eligible for the draft. In 1991, combines kept 'serious tabs on about five
thousand college players." WHITTINGHAM, supra note 25, at 44. See also Vic Carucci, Combine Still
Critical in Evaluating Talent (Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/6197027 (noting
the importance ofthe combines and the competition which results between clubs for player services after
observing players at the combine).
120
Whittingham notes that in 1991, each NFL club spent over 1 million dollars on independent
scouting, not including costs of combines. See WHITTINGHAM, supra note 25, at 44. Arnsparger notes
that Whittingham's estimates are fairly accurate today as well, but that each team varies on how much
it spends depending on its attention to detail. See E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL
Head Coach (Jan. 28, 2004).
121
Although it is not likely that this will affect the marketability and competition of first round
draft picks, this will certainly affect those players drafted in the later rounds. However, this scenario may
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any other player, then the influence from agents, player marketability, and
scouting will decrease, resulting in less competition for players' services.
More competition will result when the NFL draft operates efficiently, as
better players will distinguish themselves from mediocre ones.' 2 Likewise,
NFL clubs can distinguish between which players they wish to draft. Better
players and efficient scouting will result in a better and more defined supply
with an increase in demand for these better players.
The Special Draft Eligibility Rules assure clubs that all draft eligible
players will have at least three years after graduating high school to improve
both their mental and physical skills for the NFL.'2 As a result, each player
has a better chance at efficiently marketing his services to NFL clubs with
the help of agents.124 Agents play an integral part in this draft market for
player services, and the Special Draft Eligibility Rules aid agents in this
process. The Special Draft Eligibility Rules help increase a player's
marketability because they require players who wish to play in the NFL to
go to college 2 5 and increase their humanfootball capital'26 over a period of at

affect first round draft picks if players are allowed to enter the draft earlier because NFL clubs will have
a more difficult time determining the best potential draftees (first round picks) from the remainder of
the potential draftees.
1_2
NFL scouts are very particular in designating players as top prospects. Statistics are not the
sole way in which scouts and NFL clubs analyze draftees; they also look at physical abilities, mental
abilities, and character. See WHITINGHAM, supra note 25, at 81-83. For instance, although University
of Oklahoma quarterback Jason White won the 2004 Heisman Trophy, awarded annually to the best
college football player, he is not considered to be a first or second round draft pick. In fact, he was slated
to be a fifth or seventh round draft pick. As a result, he is not entering the NFL draft, and will play
football for the University of Oklahoma one more season in hopes of increasing his draft prospects. See
Artie Gigantino, Gingantino: No Surprises . . . Yet,
available at
http://www.foxsports.com/content/view?contentld = 1986624 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004). Therefore, as
the NFL draft becomes a more efficient market for NFLclubs, players also help create more competition
by honing their skills in college for longer periods. This creates better potential draftees, so there will
be more competition among NFL clubs to attain these better players.
12
Even with this three-year threshold, many players who leave college for the NFL draft after
theirjunior year will still not be drafted by NFL clubs. Dan Rovell reports that "[a]ccording to the
estimates, approximately half of the [forty two] juniors eligible to be taken in this year's [2004 NFL]
draft will go undrafted." Dan Rovell, Agents Predict 'Free-For-All' (Feb. 5, 2004), available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id= 1728315 [hereinafter Rovell]. Ifa player goes undrafted
it is either a result of inadequate scouting, or that the player is not ready for the NFL game.
124
When the author presented this idea to an NFL club, the NFL club agreed with the author.
See interview with an NFL club executive and an NFL club attorney who both requested to remain
anonymous (Nov. 5, 2003).
125
Presumably a player not attending college could work out on his own in order to increase his
humanfootball capital. However, most players who desire to play in the NFL will play college football in
order to increase their human football capital.
126
Increased human football capital means that the longer each player remains and develops his
skills at the collegiate level, or through individual training outside of the collegiate level, the better chance
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least three years following high school graduation. As a result, the agents are
able to sell a more defined product (the player's services) to a more
interested customer (an NFL club). 27 The draft risk is reduced because
potential draftees are better prepared for the NFLgame, more likely to catch
the eye of an NFL club through the scouting process, and more likely to
succeed in the NFL. By reducing the draft risk, competition will increase
between NFL clubs for players' services in the draft.
One cannot ignore the important role that agents play in fostering
competition among NFL clubs for players' services. Agents are able to
prompt clubs to compete for player services in the NFL draft in ways that
they would not ordinarily compete) 2 8 For example, in his 1997
autobiography, A Shark Never Sleeps, Drew Rosenhaus 29 describes the
marketing and the competition between NFL clubs that occur before clubs
draft potential first round draft picks. Specifically, Rosenhaus's dealings as
an agent for former University of Miami (Fla.) wide receiver Yatil Green in
the 1997 NFL Draft provide an example of this marketing and
competition. 130 Before Green was selected by the Dallas Cowboys,
Rosenhaus commenced discussions with different NFL coaches, such as
New Orleans Saints Head Coach Mike Ditka, about the possibility of Green
being drafted by their clubs.' In fact, minutes before the Cowboys decided
to draft Green, Cowboys Head Coach Jimmy Johnson telephoned
Rosenhaus and Green to discuss the possibility of Green playing for the
Cowboys. 132 Agents help introduce these potential draftees to various clubs,
and as a result, create interest among clubs to compete with one another in
order to draft the players that they desire.'33

he has at marketing his skills to an NFL club. In a way, this is true with many jobs, for the longer one
trains or goes to school, the more likely one will be able to create a sustained competitive market for
one's services.

See WHITrINGHAM, supra note 25 (detailing the draft process in general); RON SIMON, THE
GAME BEHINDTHEGAME 111-28 (Voyageur Press 1993) [hereinafter SIMON] (detailingthe bargaining
power that an agent has when dealing with an NFL club after the player is drafted); DREWROSENHAUS,
A SHARK NEVER SLEEPS (Pocket Books 1997) [herinafter ROSENHAUS] (detailing the bargaining power
that an agent has when dealing with an NFL club before and after the player is drafted).
1-18 But see ROSENHAUS, supra note 127, at 147-57 (explaining that most of the competition,
especially competition created by agents, for player services occurs during free agency).
129
In fact, Rosenhaus, one of the most powerful player agents in professional sports, was a model
for Tom Cruise's character in Cameron Crowe's Academy Award winning filmJerryMaguire (1996), a
drama based on the life of a sports agent. See Jeff Merron, Reel Life: Jerry Maguire,' available at
http://espn.go.com/page2/s/closer/020716.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
17

I.M
1.1
132

.13

See ROSENHAUS, supra note 127, at 167-82.
See id.

See id.
See supra footnotes 137, 155.
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Admittedly, a potential draftee suing the NFL may make the
counterargument that the increased bargaining power from agents only
affects those who are first round picks. From his experience in both the
NFL draft and the NFL, Rich Mercier observed that after the first round
"agents don't have [as much] bargaining power [or influence with NFL
clubs] ."" In fact, he noted that aside from the top picks and free agents, the
agent's bargaining power and influence is not as prevalent.' 3 5 Nevertheless,
it seems that agents are still able to partially influence a club's draft selections
in the later rounds. Agents are able to market a loiver rated player with an
adequate amount of college football experience to various clubs because they
have established relationships with particular clubs.'36 This results in more
competition between these clubs to draft this player.'3 7
Without these Special Draft Eligibility Rules, the market for player
services would be less competitive than it is currently. An agent would have
a more difficult time influencing a club to draft a lower rated player because
clubs would have more difficulty projecting the player's current and future
value due to his minimal experience and exposure (fewer than three years
removed from high school graduation). A club is more likely to draft a
player via the agent's sales pitch if the player has developed his skills as a
football player in both practice and in competition. The three-year
threshold included in the Special Draft Eligibility Rules reflects the period
oftime which is needed in order for lower ratedpotential draftees, NFL clubs,
and agents to act efficiently, creating more competition in the draft
market-the agent beingthe catalyst for a club's increased interest in a player
and the resulting competition between multiple clubs for this player.' 38
Even though the Special Draft Eligibility Rules are anticompetitive in that
they have an economic effect of keeping certain players ineligible, the Special

134

Interview with Rich Mercier, Former Offensive Lineman for the Baltimore Ravens, in Miami,

Fla. (Nov. 17, 2003).
135
See id. See also Clarke, supra note 117, at DOI (reporting how the salaries for first round draft
picks decrease from the top of the first round to the bottom of the first round).
136
In this case, the three-year threshold reflects a period of time that is necessary in order for
lowerrated potential draftees, NFL clubs, and agents to act in an efficient manner, so that the market can
be pro-competitive.
137
In other words, Club A may trade a player, or another draft pick, for Club B's earlier draft
pick, to ensure that Club A will be able to select, or have a better chance at selecting, the player that it
desires.
138
An agent facilitates more competition between clubs ifthe player hasgoodplayintgexperienceand
has matured both mentally and physically because NFL scouts and clubs are more influenced if the
player is fully ready to play at the NFL level consistently. A player is more likely to play consistently well
at the NFL level, if he has played consistently well against good competition-as compared to a currently
ineligible player who may need more years to develop or may need more years to show that he is a
consistent performer.
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Draft Eligibility Rules actually increase competition for player services
because they create a more efficient market for agents to sell players' services
to NFL clubs.
A potential draftee would attempt to counter this argument by showing
that this agent market efficiency argument does not affect NFL club
behavior enough for Special Draft Eligibility Rules to satisfy antitrust laws;
the NFL market is still chaotic and will never be truly efficient. Rob
Chudzinski, Offensive Coordinator at University ofMiami (Fla.), speculates
that the "NFL has more resources [and] would make adjustments [to find
the best playersl."139 Furthermore, in the past, the NFL and other professional sports leagues, like the National BasketballAssociation (NBA),'140 have
found players who had little exposure. Major League Baseball (MLB) has
found future star players with little exposure,' 4 ' and the Baseball draft
contains many more high school players than the NBA draft.142 Moreover,
players like Maurice Clarett are already known on a national level.
Presumably, the NFL would have no problem scouting players like Clarett,
or other college superstars who are not yet eligible for the NFL draft.
Although a player like Clarett may still have enough exposure to create
a competitive market for his services, most players do not have such national
139

Interview with Rob Chudzinski, Offensive Coordinator at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov.

19, 2003). After the completion of the 2003 college football season, Chudzinski resigned from his
positions as Offensive Coordinator and Tight Ends Coach at UM, and accepted a position as the Tight
Ends Coach for the Cleveland Browns. As a collegiate player, Chudzinski played Tight End at UM
where he earned three letters and helped UM win two of its five NCAA National Championships.
140
However, the NBA's situation is slightly different than the NFL's situation because each NBA
club has fewer players and positions needed to fill a squad. The NBA is also able to scout foreign players
more easily because many of these players already play professional basketball in Europe. Furthermore,
NBA clubs are able to scout younger players in the United States easier than NFL clubs because
basketball players play in more games than football players, and high school basketball players partake
in Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) Basketball, which allows the best players to play against each other
in tournaments where scouts can easily watch and assess talent. There is no AAU football organization.
See Telephone Interview with Martin J. Ganderson, Esq., former Norfolk, Virginia AAU Director for
the Boo Williams Summer League AAU Basketball Program (Apr. 12,2004) (agreeing with the author's
aforementioned statements).
141
Baseball, like basketball, also has an AAU organization. AAU Baseball's function in the draft
process is similar to AAU Basketball's function in the draft process. Telephone Interview with Martin
J. Ganderson, Esq., former Norfolk, Virginia AAU Director for the BooWilliams Summer League AAU
Basketball Program (Apr. 12, 2004) (agreeing with the author's aforementioned statements).
142
This is evidenced by the fact that MLB has an Amateur Draft, in which high school players
are selected by MLB clubs. However, MLB is very different from the NFL because MLB has an
extensive farm system which allows MLB clubs to foster player development-especially high school
players. The NFL's farm system is College Football, although both Rob Chudzinski and Bill Arnsparger
note that the NFL has pseudo farm systems like NFL Europe and the Arena Football League. See
Interview with Rob Chudzinski, Offensive Coordinator at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 19,2003);
E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach (Nov. 27, 2003).
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exposure (marketability). The draft market becomes less efficient and less
competitive overall when players do not have marketability because NFL
clubs have a more difficult time seeking out players who do not have such
national exposure. The Special Draft Eligibility Rules make the market, as
a whole, more competitive in both an athletic and economic sense, because
without these eligibility requirements, the majority of players entering the
draft would have no marketability. Players who develop over three years'43
after high school graduation per the Special Draft Eligibility Rules will most
likely have higher marketability than a player who has not developed over
three years. This increased marketability fosters competition between each
NFL club for player services because these potential draftees are able to
attract a club's interest more easily. Likewise, the draft risk is partially
reduced because clubs are better able to assess these players' talents.
Without the proper information, the NFL draft will not run efficiently, and
become less competitive.
Moreover, many sources agree that the NFL draft (from a player's and
club's standpoint) is more efficient and competitive with the Special Draft
Eligibility Rules in place. According to sources at the NFLPA, "players are
better off staying in college and giving both their bodies and minds time to
fully mature. That way, they'll enter the league with their earning potential
at its highest-a wise decision, given the brevity of the typical pro career.'44
Furthermore, Bill Arnsparger explains that neither a "high school player
[nor] a young college player are ready for the physical and mental challenges
of the NFL. In fact, [many players] who have completed their eligibility are
not ready for the faster pace [of the NFL]. Pro football is very demanding
in today's world." 145 Even those people who believe that a core of younger
college players could meet the mental and physical demands of the NFL still
admit that most are not ready.' 46 For example, through his experience as

143

I"

One can assume that a player will become a better player with more development.

Clarke, supra note 117, at D01.
E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach (Nov. 27, 2003).
Washington Redskins Linebacker LavarArrington and Detroit Lions Defensive Lineman Dan Wilkinson,
both of whom left early for the NFL draft, feel that no players are ready for the stresses of the NFL
before the three-year threshold of the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules. See Clarke, supra note 117,
at D01.
146 When a college player isdebating on whether to declare himself eligible for the draft under
the Special Draft Eligibility Rules, the NFL offers to evaluate the player, free of charge, to inform him
of where he may be drafted. The NFL offers this service because many players who desire to declare
themselves eligible under the Special Draft Eligibility Rules are not ready for the NFL. See Telephone
Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach (Nov. 21, 2003). The NFL seeks to dissuade
players from entering the draft who will not be top draft picks, so they can play college one more year
and improve for the draft the following year. This helps to ensure that the NFL will have better players
entering the draft. Accordingly, in his experience as an NFL coach, Arnsparger stated, "generally half
145
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Senior All-American Linebacker for the University of Miami (Fla.) playing
alongside and against the top college football players in the country,
Jonathan Vilma 147 feels that while there are some younger college players
who are ready for the NFL on a physical level, most are not ready on a
mental level; only a select few could compete in the NFL.148 Moreover, in
his experience as both a player and a college coach, Chudzinski believes that
"under one percent of [freshman and sophomores in College Football]
could play in the NFL if they left early [for the NFL draft]."'4 9
If the football players currently entering the draft, per the Special Draft
Eligibility Rules, are better football players, 51 one would assume that better
players marketing better services would create a more athletically and economically competitive market for player services between each member club.
After all, NFL clubs do not want mediocre football players because this would
create less exciting games and result in a decline in revenue.' 5' NFL clubs
only want to select the best players eligible for the draft- 2 because the NFL

of those drafted would be released by the start of the regular season [because they are not ready or able
to play football on the NFL level]." E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach
(Nov. 27, 2003). Moreover, unlike all other major professional sports leagues, the vast majority of the
contracts in the NFL are not guaranteed, so that ifa player is injured or does not perform during training
camp, a club is allowed to cut him and pay him a pro-rated salary. See SIMON, supra note 127, at 116.
147
Vilma is also slated to be a first round draft pick in the 2004 NFL Draft. See Len Pasquerelli,
available at
23,
2003),
Size Won't Stand in Vilma's Way (Feb.
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist= pasquarellilen&id = 1742044.
148
Jonathan Vilma believes he will be a first round NFL draft pick, and would have been selected
as a top draft pick if he had chosen to forgo his junior year at the UM and entered the draft early (as he
has competed against and played alongside current NFL players). He is basing his opinion on his
assessment of other players' ability as compared to his own. His ability is close to that of an NFL player.
See Interview withJonathan Vilma, All-American Senior Linebacker at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov.
3, 2003). Other players agree with Vilma. See Interview with Eric Winston, Sophomore Offensive
Lineman at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 3,2003). See Interview with Brock Berlin, RedshirtJunior
Quarterback at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 3, 2003). See Interview with Baraka Atkins, Redshirt
Freshman Defensive Lineman at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 11, 2003). See Interview with Vernon
Carey, Redshirt Senior Offensive Lineman at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 18,2003). See Interview
with Chris Myers, RedshirtJunior Offensive Lineman at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 3,2003). See
Interview withJon Peattie, Redshirt Freshman Placekicker at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 3,2003).
149
Interview with Rob Chudzinski, Offensive Coordinator at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov.
19, 2003). Chudzinski also commented that most "underclassmen aren't ready to compete in college,
much less the pro[fessional level]." Id.
15
One can assume a player who has developed mental and physical football skills for at least
three years (after graduating high school) is likely to be a better football player than he would have been
prior to this training and development.
151

See supra Parts IlA-B.

152

NFL clubs want the best players who are able to play the season directly following the NFL

draft, and who are most likely to help the club better itself on the field. See Interview with an NFL club
executive and an NFL club attorney who both requested to remain anonymous (Nov. 5, 2003).
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desires to maximize its revenues-both shared and non-shared revenues. 1 3
The NFL is simply creating an efficient, but smaller, market through the
exclusion of players who would not be selected in the draft
due to a lack of
154
experience, as well as a lack of mental and physical skills.
Competition for player services will increase with better players in the
draft, as NFL clubs desire players who are more likely to succeed; 155 there
is less competition for players' services in a mediocre draft market. Joel
Rodriguez, a RedshirtJunior Center at the University of Miami (Fla.), feels
that the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules help create "better [player]
marketability.. . by making sure that players have been in good competition."'S6 As a player who may desire to play in the NFL, it is important for
Rodriguez to present his name and football ability to the NFL because this
creates interest.'57 A player with only one year of college football experience,
or a player attempting to enter the draft directly out of high school, would
not have this same marketability or talent, and therefore, not catch the
attention of NFL clubs. This results in a decrease in competition among
clubs for player services, as a whole, and causes the market to become
watered down with less talented players.
153
Even though the NFL's revenue sharing business model depends upon each club having
relatively equal talent, clubs still compete with one another in order to get the players that will best help
their organization succeed on the field. See Interview with an NFL club executive and an NFL club
attorney who both requested to remain anonymous (Nov. 5, 2003). This results in an increase of the
non-shared revenues available to each individual club. See supra Part II.A.
154
Although physical and mental maturity is a concern that is outside the scope of an antitrust
law, it is relevant in this case because the level of maturity helps create an efficient draft market for the
NFL.
155
NFL clubs compete with one another in order to draft the best players. One common
technique that NFL clubs employ in order to secure the draft rights of a particular player isto trade up
in the draft. For example, Club A (which has the fifth overall pick) and Club B (which has the sixth
overall pick) will both offer to trade current/future draft picks, or current players, with Club C (which
has the third overall pick) in order to have a better chance at drafting the player that it desires; Club A
and Club B are competingwith each other for Club C's higher draft pick slot. This competition was best
exemplified in the 2004 NFL Draft where many NFL clubs traded up in the draft to ensure that they
would be able to draft the players that they desired. See Associated Press, ChargersDrafi Eli, Then Trade
Him to the Giants (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://sports.espn.go.con/nfldraft/draft04/news/story?id =
1788911 (noting the many NFL clubs which traded up in the first round of the 2004 Draft). An NFL
club would not trade up in the draft to select a player unless the NFL club believed that the player is
likely to succeed in the NFL.
156
Interview with Joel Rodriguez, Redshirt Junior Center at UM, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov.
11, 2003).
157
A potential draftee receives more exposure through playing college football. Furthermore,
by playing at a college which plays against other good college football teams, a potential draftee is able
to show NFL clubs his talent, which creates competition between NFL clubs to attain his draft rights.
This interest is then perpetuated as clubs observe prospective draftees at NFL scouting combines or at
college team games, practices, or workouts.
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By barring these players from entering the draft, the NFL is creating a
more efficient draft market because the draft will consist of a higher
proportion of marketable players, as compared to a draft in which these less
qualified players could enter at any time. Clubs will compete more for
players in a market designed to create the most qualified potential draftee
because the draft risk is reduced; clubs will be able to assess talent more
accurately and efficiently. Moreover, the Special Draft Eligibility Rules
ensure that each subsequent draft has the most marketable players possible,
in that those less marketable players, who would have left prior to the three
year threshold, will now develop more marketability, resulting in more
competition between clubs. "58
Nevertheless, this efficiency model argument does present a flaw. If the
Special Draft Eligibility Rules were not in effect, then presumably some
NFL clubs would select a fewyounger players currently ineligible under the
Special Draft Eligibility Rules. Some clubs may feel that the draft risk of a
younger player is low when compared to the player's possible future returns.
Moreoever, both the NBA and the NFL made exceptions to their eligibility
rules at various times in the past in order to avoid potential lawsuits. 59 In
1P

For example, in 2003, then Senior California-Berkeley Quarterback Kyle Boiler was able to

attract the attention of the Baltimore Ravens, an NFL club, during the draft, because of his play during
his senior season. In fact, Boiler impressed the Ravens so much that the Ravens traded up in the draft
in order to draft Boiler. Boiler created more marketability for himself and created competition among
teams to draft him because he did not leave for the NFL as ajunior; the Ravens would not have traded
to draft Boiler if no other team desired to draft him. Like Boiler, Senior University of Mississippi
Quarterback Eli Manningdecided to remain in college for his senior year, and as a result, he became the
first player selected in the 2004 NFL Draft. See Mel Kiper, Jr., Gamble, WilforkJoin Big Board (Jan. 7,
2004), available at http'/proxy.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=kiperjr mel&id= 1702575
(commenting that "[ilf Manning had declared for the [2003] draft last year, he could have been a late
first-rounder"). Although no NFL club traded up to draft for Manning, seeESPN.com News Services,
Chargers Still Listening to Offers (Apr.
16,
2004),
available at
http://sports.espn.go.con/nfldraft/draftO4/news/story?id = 1783996 (noting that many NFL clubs were
interested in trading up so that they could select Manning first), the NewYork Giants eventually traded
its first round draft pick, Senior North Carolina State Quarterback Philip Rivers, its 2004 third round
pick, and its first and fifth round picks in 2005 in order to acquire Manning's rights. See Associated
Press,
Swap
at
the
Top
(Apr.
24,
2004),
available
at

http.V/spotsillustrated.cnn.conV2004/football/nf/specials/draft/2004/04/24/draft.saturday.ap/index.htmi.

By analogy, this same analysis can be applied to those players who choose not to challenge the NFL's
Special Draft Eligibility Rules and remain in college until they are draft eligible per the three-year
threshold-a threshold in which the NFL believes is the requisite amount of time a player needs to
develop adequately for the NFL.
159
After Spencer Haywood, a professional basketball player, challenged the NBA draft rules, in
Denver Rockets v. Haynvood, 325 F. Supp 1049 (D. Cal. 1971), the NBA granted exceptions to its rules
through ahardship exemption, but eventually dropped this rule and opened the NBA draft to any person
who had graduated from high school. See Rosner, supra note 79, at 550-53. Prior to the enactment of
the Special Draft Eligibility Rules, the NFL had granted special exemptions to the NFL Draft Rules to

2004]

WITH THE FIRST PICKIN THE 2004 NFL DRAFT

29

reaction to the rise in potential challenges, and the fact that younger players
were developing faster both physically and mentally at the high school and
college level," 6° the NBA now allows high school players to enter its draft.' 6'
Likewise, the NFL amended its original draft eligibility rules and created its
Special Draft Eligibility Rules. 62 Thus, it seems that the NFL, along with
the NFLPA,
could create a mechanism in order to examine a player's special
3
case.

16

Yet, even if the NFL were to create a mechanism to examine specialcases,
this procedure still creates the same inefficiencies that occur when there are
no eligibility requirements. NFL clubs would still scout all players because
clubs would not know which players would declare themselves eligible for
the draft and for which year. Additionally, more under-qualified players
64
would probably enter the draft believing they could compete in the NFL.1
several players, including Notre Dame running back Al Hunter in 1977 and Pittsburgh running back
Craig (Ironhead) Heyward in 1988. In 1989, the NFL granted twenty-five hardship exemptions to
twenty-five underclassmen. See id. at 556.
160
In his experience as Head Strength and Conditioning Coach for Cornell University and
Former Offensive Lineman for the Tulane University Green Wave, Tom Howley believes that:
incoming freshmen football players are becoming more physically fit as training technology
trickles down from professional and collegiate programs. High school coaches are becoming
more aware of the advantages of having a year-round training program and have better access
to information via coaching clinics, seminars, trade magazines, etc. In addition, many of
today's high school coaches grew up doing some sort of training (either with the team or on
their own) and are more aware than their predecessors of the benefits of physical fitness
(injury prevention and performance enhancement). In addition, time and facility restrictions
at the high school level will impact the quality and quantity of the program.
E-mail Interview with Tom Howley, Head Strength and Conditioning Coach for Cornell University
and Former Offensive Lineman for the Tulane University Green Wave (Feb. 5, 2004).
161
See NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. X, § 10 (1999), available at
http://www.nbpa.com/cba/articleXhtlm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
162
The NFL's original draft eligibility rules regardingcollege football players are still the baseline
rules of eligibility. These rules states that a college football player may enter the draft if all of his college
football eligibility has expired, five years have elapsed since the player first entered a college, or the player
has graduated from a college. See CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XII,
S 12.1(A) (2003). The Special Draft Eligibility Rules simply amended these baseline rules to allow for
players to apply to enter the draft after "three full college seasons have elapsed since their high school
graduations." CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE app. 1990-4(1) (2003).

160
Ifthe NFL and the NFLPA created amechanism-and codified it in the CBA-to allow those
who are currently exempted from the draft to petition the NFL to enter the draft, then presumably it
would be exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the non-statutory labor exemption. See supra Parts I.B,
IV.B.2. See also Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, No. 03-CV-7441,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *9193 (describing less restrictive alternatives to the Special Draft Eligibility Rules).
164
However, many players would still choose not to enter the draft early because they realize that
they are not physically and mentally ready for the NFL. Accordingly, those players who leave early, but
who are not ready for the NFL's high level of play, are less likely to be drafted, and are more likely to
be cut from an NFL team in training camp, as they do not possess the talent to play in the NFL. Players
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This results in a larger mediocre draft pool, which would result in less
athletic competition, and less economic competition. By preventing a player
like Maurice Clarett from entering the draft for an additional year, the NFL
is merely creating a more efficient and competitive draft market for all
potential draftees' services. IfClarett has another successful college football
season, more clubs will compete for his draft rights. If he does not have
another successful season, then clubs will not compete as much for his
services and will compete for others who have proven that they are more
consistent and better equipped to succeed at the NFL level after three years
ofpreparation."6 The Special Draft Eligibility Rules guarantee that the draft
will be as athletically competitive as possible each year because they
guarantee that all players have at least a certain amount of marketability and
humanfootball capital.6 The better the pool of players in the draft each year,
the more athletic competition there is between clubs for players' services in
the draft market each year. Thus, this increased athletic competition results
in greater economic competition between each club.
5. THREE-YEAR THRESHOLD AS NON-ARBITRARY

One final hurdle that the NFL may face is whether the three-year
threshold is so arbitrary that there is no valid reason for adopting it, 67
especially when compared to other professional leagues 168 and the history
of the draft. 69 However, the NFL should argue that this three-year

choose to stay in their college football programs, for these schools place student athletes in highly intense
game situations, lifting programs, and daily practices, so that they can hone their skills as football players.
i5
Note that this argument worries many players because they may injure themselves, or their
player stock may decrease before they become eligible. Therefore, they may either never play football at
the professional level, or play with a substantially smaller contract than they would have had minus the
Special Draft Eligibility Rules. E.g., Interview with Ryan Moore, Redshirt Freshman Wide Receiver for
UM in Coral Gables, Fla. (Nov. 12, 2003).

166
The Special Draft Eligibility Rules guarantee that the draft will be as athletically competitive
as possible each year because it guarantees that all players have a certain amount of marketability and
human football capital.
167
Howley stated that he did not "have a clue as to why the NFL has arule preventing players
from leaving [for the NFL] prior to [the three-year threshold]." E-mail Interview with Tom Howley,
Head Strength and Conditioning Coach for Cornell University and Former Offensive Lineman for the
Tulane University Green Wave (Jan. 4, 2004).
168
None of the other major professional sports leagues' (NBA, MLB, NHL) eligibility
requirements are as stringent as the NFL's eligibility requirements. SeeJeff Schultz, Clarett's Suit Opens
NFL Pandora's Box, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Sept. 25, 2003), available at
www.ajc.com/sports/content/sports/columns/schultz/092503.htm (speculatingwhy the NBA, MLB, and
NHL have less stringent draft eligibility requirements than the NFL, and the repercussions of each
professional leagues' less stringent draft eligibility requirements).

169

See Rosner, supra note 79, at 556. The NFL's current and past eligibility rules have been the
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threshold requirement is not arbitrary and serves a legitimate business
purpose.170 For example, Arnsparger states that the current three-year
threshold allows players to make key "gains in maturity [both] physically
and mentally." 171 These gains made during the three-year threshold are
essential, for "many [players who] have completed their eligibility [requirements] are not even ready for the faster pace [of the NFL]." 172 Further-

more, Bernie DePalma, Head Athletic Trainer/Physical Therapist for
Cornell University, finds that the three-year threshold is justified. 73 He
asserts that "an [eighteen] year old cannot compete physically with a mature
[twenty-four] year old, or even a [twenty-one] year old-there's a
tremendous
difference physiologically (strength, power, muscle endurance,
17 4
"

etc.).

Although a draft age restriction on its face would violate antitrust law,17 5
this three-year threshold is technically not an age requirement since persons
176
applying for eligibility pursuant to the rule can be of different ages.
Eligibility depends on a player's graduation date from high school; the threeyear threshold is merely an experience and maturity requirement, not an age
requirement. Presumably, the NFL believes that three years is needed for
players to develop both mentally, on and off the field, and physically for the
NFL. 177 On the other hand, if the NFL is wrong, and most players can

four or five year rule. It seems that the NFL amended its eligibility rules to allow for the current Special
Draft Eligibility Rules and the three-year threshold to avoid potential future lawsuits of underclassmen
who desired to enter the NFL draft before they graduated or were no longer eligible. Accordingly, the
NFL may one day amend its current Special Draft Eligibility Rules to allow for younger players to enter
the draft earlier.
17)
See supra Part II.A.
E-mail Interview with Bill Arnsparger, former NFL Head Coach (Nov. 27, 2003).
171
Id. John Gruden, Head Coach for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, commented: "I don't see how
172
an [eighteen] or [nineteen] year old is ready for the NFL. This is a year-round job and they've never
been through that. Personally, I don't want any (eighteen] or [nineteen] year olds in my locker room."
ESPN.com News Services, Coach Contradicts Emmit's Support (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id =1623700.
173
See E-mail Interview with Bernie DePalma, Head Athletic Trainer/Physical Therapist for
Cornell University (Jan. 6, 2004).
174
Id.
175
See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp 1315, 1320-21 (D. Conn. 1977).
176
Therefore, a gifted student athlete could potentially graduate high school at the age of fifteen,
and declare for the NFL draft at the age of eighteen. However, an NFL club is not likely to draft such
a young player due to his lack of physical and mental development.
17
This is similar to the arguments the government makes when setting age requirements for
alcohol sales/consumption and a driver's license. Although the aforementioned regulations serve a
legitimate state interest, it would followthat the Special Draft Eligibility Requirements serve a legitimate
interest in the eyes of the NFL, which for all intents and purposes is equivalent to the government in
regards to football.
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compete in the NFL before the three-year threshold accrues,' 78 one
presumes that there would have been more lawsuits challenging the NFL's
Rules in the past, other than Clarett's pending lawsuit. 7 9 Nonetheless, the
three-year threshold is rationally related to a legitimate business purpose
because it increases competition between clubs for players' services in the
draft market. The threshold also ensures that there will not be a "chaotic
bidding market for the services of college players."" Further, it helps to
increase the competitive nature of the league, which results in more
revenues.'' After all, why should the NFL be penalized for having a
threshold experience requirement when many jobs demand a requisite
amount of experience which is not in violation of antitrust law?
V. FIFTH ROUND-CONCLUSIONS
In order to prevail against an antitrust challenge to its Special Draft
Eligibility Rules, the NFL must prove, under a Rule of Reason analysis, that
its Special Draft Eligibility Rules "have positive, economically [p] rocompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects, or, at the least, if it is
demonstrated to accomplish legitimate business purposes and to have a net
anticompetitive effect that is [i] nsubstantial. " 's It seems that the NFL could
have presented the aforementioned efficiency arguments to prove that its
Special Draft Eligibility Rules help to foster athletic and economic competition between NFL clubs for potential draftees' services. In fact the Special
Draft Eligibility Rules create a more procompetitive market than if they were
not in effect. However, despite these arguments, the key to success in
challenging the Special Draft Eligibility Rules under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act will be whether a court is able to understand the NFL's unique
business structure, the game and nature of professional football, and the
importance of the draft process in general. If the NFL had presented the
aforementioned arguments, then Paul Tagliabue, the present Commissioner
of the NFL, would not have to worry about saying: with the first pick of the

178
1

See Rovell, supra note 123, at 34.
In 1994, Florida State Wide Receiver Tamarick Vanover, a true sophomore, attempted to

challenge the NFL's Special Draft Eligibility Rules, but did not succeed. See Rosner, supra note 79, at
556 n.128.
180
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Moreover, the Smith court
stated that"some form of player selection system may serve to regulate and thereby promote competition
in what would be a chaotic bidding market for the services of college players." Id. The Special Draft
Eligibility Rules and the three-year threshold do regulate and promote competition. See supra Part I.B.
181

See supra Part llA.

182

Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188-89.
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NFL draft, an NFL club selects a player who is less than three years out of
high school.

